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Bank Competition and Financial Stability: Evidence from the Financial Crisis  
 
 
Abstract 
We examine the link between bank competition and financial stability using the recent financial 
crisis as the setting. We utilize variation in banking competition at the state level and find that 
banks facing less competition are more likely to engage in risky activities, more likely to face 
regulatory intervention, and more likely to fail. Focusing on the real estate market, we find that 
states with less competition had higher rates of mortgage approval, experienced greater housing 
price inflation before the crisis, and a steeper housing price decline during it. Overall, our study 
is consistent with greater competition increasing financial stability. 
 
Keywords: competition, risk-taking, bank regulation, bank failure 
 
JEL codes: G01, G21, G33 
 
  
2 
 
I. Introduction 
In recent decades, the banking sector in the US has steadily consolidated. During the 
recent financial crisis, politicians and regulators expressed concern about the lack of competition 
in the banking industry and the role it may have played in the crisis and recovery. In a speech on 
banking reform on January 21, 2010, President Barack Obama argued that the “American people 
will not be served by a financial system that comprises just a few massive firms. That's not good 
for consumers; it's not good for the economy.”1 On March 20, 2010, Federal 
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke made a similar argument that the existence of large, 
systemically risky firms skews competition in the financial services industry, suggesting that the 
current marketplace “falls substantially short” when it comes to open competition.2 In February 
2012, the Dallas Federal Reserve President, Richard Fisher, articulated that “after the crisis, the 
five largest banks had a higher concentration of deposits than they did before the crisis. I am of 
the belief personally that the power of the five largest banks is too concentrated.”3 
The issue of bank competition and stability has also attracted significant academic 
attention. The conventional theory, known as the “charter value hypothesis,” argues that banks 
balance the gains from increased risk-taking with the loss of charter value if it fails. Banks with 
more market power have higher charter values because they are able to charge higher rents. The 
increased charter value deters risk-taking behavior because it increases the opportunity cost of 
bankruptcy. An increase in competition will reduce the value of bank charters, which, in turn, is 
associated with an increase in risk-taking (Keeley (1990), Allen and Gale (2000), Hellmann 
Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000), Repullo (2004)). In contrast, Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) argue 
that this theory ignores the effect of bank competition on borrowers’ behavior. Their model of 
                                                 
1 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-financial-reform. 
2 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100320a.htm. 
3 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/29/us-banks-fisher-idUSTRE81S1WY20120229.  
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borrowers’ behavior shows that, in equilibrium, a lack of competition may lead to lower bank 
stability. As the lending market becomes more concentrated, banks use their market power to 
charge higher loan rates, leading to an increase in their interest margin. Higher loan rates 
increase the probability of bankruptcy for borrowers, who respond by undertaking riskier 
projects (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). This response by borrowers is ignored by the charter value 
hypothesis. The increased likelihood of borrower default reduces bank stability.4  
Apart from the formal models of banking competition, competition can have beneficial 
effects on financial stability by stimulating innovation and encouraging efficiency. This can 
enhance banks’ responsiveness in times of crisis, which increases financial stability. In addition, 
large market power can induce excessive risk-taking if there is an implicit government guarantee 
for ‘too big to fail’ banks. Given the theoretical debate, mixed empirical evidence, the 
consolidation in the banking sector, and the direction taken in banking reforms, it is important to 
reexamine the link between competition and risk-taking and how this link fits in the broader 
framework of competition and financial stability.  
The objective of this study is to conduct a comprehensive empirical examination of the 
relation between competition within the banking industry and financial stability in the United 
States. In particular, we utilize variation in banking competition across states to examine the 
impact on (1) individual bank actions and outcomes, and (2) the housing and mortgage market 
within states. Ideally, we would use only exogenous variation in competition. Some prior 
research has used banking deregulations as a natural experiment (e.g., Jayaratne and Strahan 
(1996), Galloway, Lee, and Roden (1997), Zarutskie (2006)). However, the restrictions on 
interstate banking were lifted well before our sample period, and no longer have significant 
                                                 
4 Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) show that, depending on the degree of correlation in the default rates across 
loans, the relation could become U-shaped as well. Increasing competition initially reduces bank failure (as in Boyd 
and DeNicolo, 2005), but beyond a certain point competition increases bank failure. 
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explanatory power for competition in our sample, thereby making it unsuitable as an instrument. 
In addition, while the theoretical models investigate equilibrium actions for a given level of 
competition, deregulation leads to a change in competition. The disruption to established banks 
and the entry of new untested banks following deregulation may temporarily lead to greater 
instability, even if a higher degree of competition in steady-state would be beneficial. Therefore, 
rather than using a shock to the level of competition, we use a shock to the financial system, and 
examine the resilience of banks to this shock as a function of the degree of competition they face. 
We examine the effects of bank competition both before and after the financial crisis on 
(1) individual bank actions and failures, and (2) mortgage lending and housing prices. Our first 
set of analyses of bank competition and individual bank actions is comprised of two parts. Prior 
to the crisis, we examine how the degree of competition a bank faces is associated with its 
actions by examining five dimensions of bank risk-taking that could link competition and bank 
stability: the interest margin, Tier 1 capital, the fraction of risky assets, profitability, and 
liquidity. During the crisis, we study how competition is associated with the likelihood of 
regulatory enforcement actions and bank failure. Our second set of analyses of bank competition 
and housing prices is also conducted in two parts. First, because changes in the real estate market 
were a significant factor in the financial crisis, we examine the relationship between competition 
and changes in the housing price indices in different states before and during the crisis. To gain 
more insight on how banking competition may have affected real estate prices, we examine the 
relation between banking competition and individual mortgage lending decisions.  
In our first set of analyses, we document that just before the crisis, more competition is 
associated with banks charging a lower interest margin, maintaining a lower Tier 1 capital ratio, 
holding a less risky portfolio of assets, having lower profitability and maintaining lower 
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liquidity. During the crisis, more competition is associated with a lower likelihood of 
enforcement actions and bank closure. We find results consistent with the theory advocated by 
Boyd and De Nicoló: more competition is associated with less risk-taking. In our second set of 
analyses, we find that more competition is associated with a smaller increase in the housing price 
index before the financial crisis and a smaller decrease in the housing price index during it. This 
result suggests that more competition had a disciplinary effect that mitigated the housing price 
inflation before the crisis and the deflation afterward. We also find that greater competition is 
associated with higher mortgage rejection rates. This effect is strongest for the highest risk 
mortgages, i.e., those for borrowers with the lowest income-to-loan ratios. Overall, the results are 
consistent with a lack of competition contributing to the inflation of housing prices and the 
subsequent reversal. 
Our study contributes to the empirical literature on the relationship between competition 
and risk-taking. The findings in this literature are mixed. Early empirical evidence from the 
United States is generally motivated by the banking crises of the 1980s. With banking 
deregulation reforms and increased competition, banks across the US suffered unprecedented 
failure. According to the FDIC, 1,143 banks failed from 1983-1990, while only 228 failed from 
1945-1982. In general, empirical evidence within the United States has supported the 
competition-fragility view. Keeley (1990) finds that more competition, as measured by a lower 
Tobin’s q, is associated with greater risk-taking, measured as the default risk using either the 
market-value capital-to-asset ratio or the interest cost on large certificates of deposit. However, 
as noted by both Keeley and by subsequent researchers, q is an indirect measure of competition 
that is itself affected by risk-taking. Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996) and Galloway et 
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al. (1997) also test the charter value hypothesis and find that, consistent with Keeley’s theory, 
banks with a higher franchise value take less risk than do banks with a low franchise value.  
Using the Texas real estate crisis as an exogenous shock, Gan (2004) documents that 
competition reduces franchise value, which induces risk-taking among thrifts. Gan employs two 
measures of risk: direct investment in real estate as a percentage of assets and brokered deposits 
as a percentage of assets. She uses the logarithmic transformation of the number of thrifts in a 
town and the number of bank branches as two measures of competition. In an international 
setting, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006) find that crises are less likely to occur in 
countries with more concentrated banking systems (measured using the market share of the three 
largest banks). Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009) find results generally consistent with this 
theory—banks with higher market power generally have less overall risk exposure.   
The competition-stability view advocated by Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) suggests that 
more competition decreases risk-taking, which is supported by several international studies. 
Investigating the relation between the concentration ratio and bank risk, De Nicoló, 
Bartholomew, Zaman, and Zephirin (2004) find that countries with more concentrated banking 
systems show higher levels of risk-taking. Using the Herfindahl index, this is confirmed by 
Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010). Barth, Lin, Lin, and Song (2009) also find that bank 
competition reduces corruption in bank lending, which can improve bank stability. Using the 
ability of banks to pass on cost increases as a measure of competition, Schaeck, Cihak, and 
Wolfe (2009) also find that more competition reduces risk-taking. They find that countries with 
more competitive banking systems are less likely to experience a financial crisis. Consistent with 
the lending rate channel in Boyd and De Nicoló (2005), Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006) find 
that after banks merge, they charge higher interest rates. In contrast, using the Lerner index as a 
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measure of market power, Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens (2013) find on average a negative 
relation between market power and risk-taking, but show that the strength of the relation varies 
across countries based country level institutions. Boyd, De Nicoló, and Jalal (2010) find that 
when bank competition is higher, the bankruptcy risk of the bank is lower, borrower risk is 
lower, and the loan-to-asset ratio is higher, consistent with the predictions about the impact of 
bank competition on bank risk and asset allocations in the model by Boyd, De Nicoló, and Jalal 
(2009). 
A related literature focuses on the effect of competition on the types of loans banks make. 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) hypothesize and find that banks in a less competitive environment are 
more likely to finance credit-constrained firms. Their results are corroborated by Zarutskie 
(2006), who shows that firms with the largest information asymmetries have less debt when 
banking markets are more competitive. Both Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Zarutskie (2006) 
show that competition among banks discourages them from lending to firms whose credit 
qualities are unknown; hence, competition mitigates risk-taking. In addition, Bergstresser (2010) 
finds that households report being less credit-constrained if they live in an area where banks 
enjoy more market power.  
What separates our study from the more recent empirical work is that it employs only US 
data, using variation in competition across the different states. This allows us to use a large 
sample of public and private commercial banks and to achieve greater homogeneity in the legal 
and regulatory framework. Furthermore, our study also benefits from the fact that it studies the 
pre-crisis and crisis periods and thus uses the crisis as a quasi-natural experiment that allows us 
to study actual bank failures rather than only indirect proxies. In addition, we show that the level 
of bank competition affects mortgage lending decisions and housing prices. 
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  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the construction of our 
competition measures in Section II. We show the results of competition on banks’ actions pre-
crisis in Section III and competition and regulatory actions during the crisis in Section IV. We 
provide the results of competition and real estate prices and mortgage lending decisions in 
Section V. Finally, we conclude in Section VI. 
  
II. Measuring Competition among Banks  
  Researchers have used various measures of competition to test the relationship between 
competition and risk-taking. Keeley (1990) uses Tobin’s q as an indirect measure of competition. 
Subsequent work has focused on more direct measures, including: the number of banks (e.g., 
Gan (2004)), concentration ratios (e.g., De Nicoló et al. (2004), Beck et al. (2006)), the 
Herfindahl index (e.g., Boyd et al. (2010)), bank mergers (e.g., Garmaise and Moskowitz 
(2006)), and the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic5 (e.g., Claessens and Laeven (2004), Schaeck et al. 
(2009)). 
In their review of the empirical literature on the relation between competition in banking 
markets and bank risk exposure, Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) propose that studies should use 
competition measures such as the Herfindahl Index and the concentration ratio. This is also 
consistent with the horizontal merger guidelines that the Federal Reserve Board and the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency rely on when they analyze the likely competitive effects of a 
bank merger (U.S. Department of Justice (1995)). Specifically, the guidelines state that the initial 
screening of whether a planned merger transaction is anti-competitive should be based on the 
Herfindahl Index. Given these precedents, we use the Herfindahl Index and the concentration 
                                                 
5 The H-statistic is calculated by “estimating the sum of the elasticities of reduced-form revenue equations with 
respect to factor input prices (…) the H-statistic measures the ability of a bank to pass on increases in factor input 
prices to customers” (Schaeck et al. (2009), p. 714). 
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ratio as the primary competition measures in our tests. However, we find similar results in 
robustness analyses using the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic of Claessens and Laeven (2004).  
We calculate the competition measures using the distribution of deposits reported in the 
FDIC’s Summary of Deposits (SOD).6 We use deposits rather than loans, since detailed data 
about the distribution of bank operations is only available for deposits. The SOD contains mid-
year branch level deposits for all institutions insured by the FDIC. Using this data, we measure 
the extent of competition among all banks within each of the 50 states and in Washington, D.C. 
in each year. For brevity, we will use the term states to refer to the 50 states and Washington, 
D.C.. 
The Herfindahl index and the concentration ratio are market level measures of 
competition. Ideally, we would like bank level measures of competition so that we can perform 
the analysis at the bank level and control for bank level characteristics. To do this we first 
calculate the competition at the market level, then at the bank level as the weighted average 
competition of each market the bank operates in. We choose states as the geographic region to 
measure market level competition because banks are typically licensed and supervised by state 
banking regulators; as a result, these regulators play a role in determining the level of 
competition within the state. Moreover, the state level analysis allows us to control for state level 
regulations regarding recourse and non-recourse mortgages in the analysis of the mortgage 
market.  
In contrast, metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) can cross state lines and do not cover 
all the banks’ branches, leading to incomplete measures of competition for any bank with 
branches outside of MSAs. Measuring competition at the county level is also problematic. First, 
competition among banks is likely to extend beyond county lines, especially in states with many 
                                                 
6 This data can be accessed at http://www2.fdic.gov/sod/index.asp.  
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small counties or with certain counties that provide significant banking services to people in 
other counties. Second, there is discretion in the assignment of deposits across branches and this 
is more likely to average out in larger geographic units such as states rather than counties since 
the vast majority of banks operate in a single state.7 Finally, as a result of these issues, almost 
half of the counties in the sample have 5 or less branches, thus making the county level 
competition measures less useful. 
The unit of analysis is the commercial bank (rather than the bank holding company 
(BHC)) because our data on bank failures and bank regulatory actions is at the commercial bank 
level. However, two commercial banks, both owned by the same parent bank holding company, 
are not independent competitors. Therefore, when calculating the market level measures of 
competition we first aggregate up to the BHC level within each state.8 Similarly, while we do not 
include thrifts in our analyses, we do include them in calculating the extent of competition in 
each market, since they directly compete with commercial banks. Thus the market level measure 
of competition takes into account the effect of both BHC relations and thrifts on the overall 
banking competition, even though our tests examine the effects of competition on commercial 
banks only.  
Our first measure is the Herfindahl Index based on deposits in banks and thrifts. Since 
banks compete with thrifts in attracting deposits and making loans, we include thrifts in the 
calculation of our competition measures. First, for each institution j, we aggregate within each 
                                                 
7 According to the FDIC, county represents the physical location of the branch or main office. For the purpose of the 
SOD data, deposits are allocated to each office in a manner consistent with their existing internal record-keeping 
practices. Examples of assignment are office in closest proximity to the account holder’s address, office where the 
deposit account is most active, and office of origination of the account. Other methods that logically reflect the 
deposit gathering activity of the bank’s branch offices may be used. It is recognized that certain classes of deposits 
and deposits of certain types of customers may be assigned to a single office for reasons of convenience or 
efficiency.  The deposit assignment (e.g., consolidation of the accounting for deposits at the main office) is likely to 
have resulted in fewer recorded branches in each county. 
8 The competition measures based on bank holding companies and those based purely on commercial banks are 
highly correlated and our results are very similar if we instead aggregate throughout at the commercial bank level. 
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state the amount of deposits for all branches of that bank or thrift (taking into account any bank 
holding company affiliations). Then for each state s, we measure the Herfindahl Index, 
Herfindahls, as: 
(1)    𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎ℎ𝑙 𝑠 = ∑ (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑗𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑠 )2𝐽𝑗=1 , 
where Depositss,j is the amount of deposits held by institution j in state s, Depositss is the total 
amount of deposits held by all institutions in state s, and J is the total number of banks and thrifts 
in state s.  
The concentration ratio is the percentage of bank deposits within a state held by the five 
largest institutions operating within that state. For each state s, we measure the concentration 
ratio in each year, Concentrations, as: 
(2)   𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  = ∑ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑗𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑗=5𝑗=1 ,     
where Depositss,j is the amount of deposits held by each of the top five institutions in state s, and 
Depositss is the total amount of deposits held by all institutions in state s.  
The above measures are calculated at the state level. Because we also examine the effects 
of competition at the bank level, we need to determine the extent of competition faced by each 
bank, including banks that operate in multiple states. To do so, we take the competition the bank 
faces in each state where it operates and weight it by the fraction of the bank’s deposits that are 
in that state. The resulting weighted average competition measure is our bank-specific measure 
of competition: 
(3)   𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗  = ∑ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑗𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑗 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑆𝑠=1 ,  
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where Depositss,j is the amount of deposits held by bank j in state s, and Depositsj is the total 
amount of deposits held by bank j, and Competitions is the competition measure for state s (either 
the Herfindahl index or the concentration ratio).  
 Thus the power of our measure of competition comes from having a comprehensive 
sample of commercial banks whose measured exposure in competition arises from two sources: 
i) the variation in bank competition across the different states, and ii) the spread of each bank’s 
activities across each of these states. 
Figure 1 presents the concentration ratio, the deposit market share of the top five bank 
holding companies, over the last decade. Continuing the trend of the previous decades, the 
market share of the top 5 banks increases over this time period. This increase is most pronounced 
for the concentration ratio for the US as a whole (the dashed line). The average concentration 
ratio across the states (the solid line) increases less by comparison. This suggests that over the 
last decade the primary consolidation in the banking sector has been nationwide rather than 
within state.   
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 1 presents descriptive information about the banks in each of the 50 states and 
Washington, D.C. There is significant variation in terms of the amount of deposits, the measures 
of competition, the number of banks, the number of regulatory enforcements, and the number of 
bank failures across states. In 2006, New York had the highest bank deposits, at $731 billion, 
while Alaska and Vermont had the lowest bank deposits, at $7 billion. Kansas had both the 
lowest Herfindahl Index and the lowest concentration ratio at 0.021 and 0.260, respectively. 
South Dakota had the highest Herfindahl Index, 0.756, and Hawaii, which has one of the lowest 
number of banks, had the highest concentration ratio at 0.978.  
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[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
During this time period, the US Department of Justice’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
(2010) classified the degree of competition based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index into three 
regions that can be broadly characterized as unconcentrated (Herfindahl below 0.1), moderately 
concentrated (Herfindahl between 0.1 and 0.18), and highly concentrated (Herfindahl above 
0.18). Based on this standard, almost half of the states (49%) exhibit moderate to high 
concentration. This would suggest that despite the large number of banks in the US, the 
commercial banking sector is not fully competitive in all states. 
Based on the distribution of our sample of 7,351 banks filing call reports at the end of 
2007, Illinois and Alaska have the highest and lowest number of banks, respectively.9 We 
examine the distribution of enforcement orders and bank failures that occurred between 2008 and 
2010. There are similarities in the distribution of the incidence of enforcement orders and bank 
failures across the states, which is not surprising because both enforcement orders and bank 
failures are indicators of bank instability. For example, states with more regulatory enforcement 
actions such as California (61), Georgia (56), Illinois (55), and Florida (53) also experience more 
bank failures, with 26 failed banks in California, 48 in Georgia, 36 in Illinois, and 33 in Florida. 
In comparison, Texas, another large state, had only 24 enforcement actions and 7 bank failures. 
 
III. Competition and Specific Dimensions of Bank Risk-Taking Pre-Crisis 
Before moving to the analysis of regulatory enforcement and bank failures, we first 
examine the relation between competition and specific dimensions of bank risk-taking pre-crisis. 
We consider this issue for several reasons. First, it allows us to directly test some of the 
intermediate steps predicted by theory, particularly whether this relation affects the interest 
                                                 
9 Note that we arrive at this sample after the data requirements discussed in the next section. 
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charged. Second, it enables us to examine whether there are any competing effects among risk 
dimensions. For example, if competition affects lending to riskier borrowers, do banks adjust 
their capital holdings to exacerbate or partially offset the higher risk? Third, these types of 
measures are often used in prior research due to an insufficient number of bank failures. Fourth, 
it allows us to examine in the bank failure analysis the extent to which these ex-ante risk proxies 
are a sufficient statistic for the effect of competition on the overall risk of bank failure. 
The specific dimensions of bank risk-taking are the interest margin (Interest_margin), the 
capitalization (Tier 1), the riskiness of the asset portfolio (Asset_risk), the earnings performance 
(ROA), and the liquidity level (Liquidity). Our first bank action is the Interest_margin, which is 
defined as the interest rate for loans (interest revenue divided by total loans) minus the interest 
rate for deposits (interest expense divided by total deposits), expressed as a percentage. We 
examine this for two reasons. First, examining the interest margin provides a validity check for 
our competition proxies. Economic theory suggests that banks facing greater competition should 
have lower interest margins. Second, the theory in Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) depends on this 
link between competition and interest rates.  
Our other measures are motivated by some of the key components of the CAMELS 
(Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management capability, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to 
market risk) rating system, which regulators use to assess bank risk in their periodic 
examinations. To capture capital adequacy, we use Tier 1 capital as a percentage of total assets, 
Tier 1. We use this to measure the amount of risk the bank is taking on the equity and liability 
side of the balance sheet.10 To capture asset quality, we use Asset_risk, which is the percentage 
of total assets, including derivatives and off-balance sheet items, with a risk weight of 100%. We 
                                                 
10 We do not scale by the risk-weighted assets because we want to separately analyze the level of asset risk and 
equity capital that the bank chooses to hold. 
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use this as a direct measure of the amount of risk the bank is taking on the asset side of the 
balance sheet. To capture earnings, we use bank performance, ROA, which is the net income 
before taxes and extraordinary items as a percentage of total assets. We use this to measure the 
bank’s overall profitability. Finally, to capture liquidity, Liquidity, we use cash as a percentage of 
total deposits. We have no direct proxies for the Management and Sensitivity components of the 
CAMELS ratings. All five variables are constructed using data from the December 2007 Call 
reports.  
 Using data from the pre-crisis period, we examine these predictions using the following 
regression specification:  
(4)   Bank Action = α + β1 Competition + Σ βj Controls j + ε.    
The key independent variables of interest are the proxies for bank competition in 2006. 
Our measures of competition are Competition-H and Competition-C. We construct these 
variables in two steps. First, as discussed in Section II, we assign to each bank the deposits-
weighted state level Herfindahl Index and concentration ratio. Competition-H and Competition-C 
are then obtained by multiplying these numbers by minus one, so that higher values of 
Competition-H and Competition-C indicate greater competition.  
We control for several bank characteristics in our analysis (Controls). We control for 
bank portfolio characteristics such as total assets (Total_asset), total loans as a percentage of 
total assets (Loan_to_asset), real estate loans as a percentage of total loans (Loan_real_estate), 
and the percentage of total deposits that are uninsured by the FDIC (Uninsured_deposit). We 
also control for the primary federal regulator (FED, OCC), because prior literature suggests that 
there are differences in the levels of enforcement across regulators (e.g., Hill, 2011). FED and 
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OCC are indicator variables equal to one if the respective federal agency is responsible for that 
bank’s oversight. The FDIC oversees all banks not regulated by the FED or the OCC.  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses. The average 
interest margin is 4.83%. Approximately 56.88% of the total assets have a risk weight of 100%. 
Banks are well capitalized: the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets is 10.42%. They are 
profitable on average, with an average ROA of 1.11%. On average, banks hold 5.28% of their 
total deposits in the form of cash. 
The means for Competition-H and Competition-C, our measures of competition, are         
-0.082 and -0.491, respectively. The average size of the banks, in terms of total assets, is $0.472 
billion. Loans constitute 66.58% of the total assets. Of the loans, 68.63% are real estate loans. 
40.26% of the deposits are uninsured. The FED oversees 12.4% of the banks in our sample, the 
OCC 20.8%, and the FDIC 66.8%. Finally, 8.6% of the banks received enforcement orders and 
3.6% of the banks failed between 2008 and 2010.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 3, we present the regression analysis of the relation between the competition a 
bank faces and specific dimensions of bank risk-taking. The first two columns present the results 
for the interest margin. The coefficient for Competition-H (Competition-C) is -1.370 (-1.763) and 
is statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that more competition is negatively 
associated with the interest margin. Specifically, a one standard deviation change in 
Competition-H (Competition-C) is associated with an 11.34 bps (23.22 bps) difference in the 
interest margin. While we use the net interest margin in our main test, we also separately analyze 
the interest paid on deposits and the interest charged on loans. We find that greater competition 
is associated with higher deposit interest and lower interest charged on loans; both these findings 
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are statistically significant. This is consistent with the argument that banks exploit their market 
power by charging higher interest rates for loans and offering lower interest rates for deposits. In 
contrast, differences in concentration across countries are less reliably related to interest spreads 
(e.g., Hao, Nandy and Roberts (2012)).  
In these tests, and in all of our regressions, we find a negative coefficient on real estate as 
a percentage of total loans. This is likely due to the belief held prior to the crisis that real estate 
loans were safer because they provided greater collateral.  
Next, the results in columns 3 and 4 show that banks in more competitive environments 
have lower Tier 1 capital ratios. The coefficients for Competition-H and Competition-C are -
3.340 and -3.062, respectively. A one standard deviation change in Competition-H (Competition-
C) is associated with a 0.27% (0.04%) difference in Tier 1 capital ratios. This suggests that any 
effect of competition on risk-taking in asset allocation is partially offset by the amount of equity 
capital the banks choose to hold. One potential explanation is that banks in less competitive 
markets accumulate greater equity because of greater profitability.  
Columns 5 and 6 show the results for asset risk. We find that more competition is 
associated with less asset risk as the coefficients for Competition-H and Competition-C are 
statistically significant: -12.099 and -6.436, respectively. The economic interpretation of these 
effects is that a one standard deviation change in Competition-H (Competition-C) is associated 
with a 1.00% (0.85%) difference in the percentage of total assets with a risk weight of 100%. 
These results suggest that more competition is associated with a reduction in the riskiness of the 
banks’ asset portfolios.  
We examine the relation between the profitability of banks and competition, using ROA. 
The results are presented in columns 7 and 8. We find that banks operating in more competitive 
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markets have lower ROA, as shown by the coefficient for Competition-H, which is -0.513 and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. However, our results when using our Competition-C 
proxy, while qualitatively similar, are not statistically significant.  
Finally, columns 9 and 10 present the results of the relation of liquidity and competition.  
We find that banks operating in more competitive markets have lower liquidity: the coefficient 
for Competition-H (Competition-C) is -2.014 (-2.603) and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The economic interpretation of these effects is that a one standard deviation change in 
Competition-H (Competition-C) is associated with a 0.17% (0.34%) decrease in liquidity.  
 The results in these tests suggest that banks facing greater competition charge lower 
interest rates and invest in less risky loans, both of which reduce the risk of bank failure. 
However, these banks also have lower profitability, and at least partially offset their lower risk 
by holding less liquid assets and less equity capital. It is therefore important to examine actual 
bank failures to determine the overall effect of competition on risk-taking and the risk of bank 
failure. 
 [INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
IV. Competition and Regulatory Actions against Banks during the Crisis 
The prior tests focused on specific ex-ante dimensions of bank financial stability through 
proxies for the components of CAMELS ratings system used by bank regulators. We now turn 
towards overall ex-post measures of financial stability. In particular, we examine the effect of 
bank competition on regulatory actions taken against banks during the crisis. Specifically, we 
examine two regulatory actions: regulatory enforcement orders and bank closure. Banks are 
subjected to periodic examinations by their regulators. The regulators’ examinations consist of a 
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comprehensive review of six components of a bank’s financial conditions, the CAMELS ratings. 
If the examination reveals serious weaknesses, regulators can take formal administrative actions 
to ensure that the bank remedies them. While ratings are confidential, formal regulatory orders 
are publicly disclosed on the relevant regulator’s website (the FDIC, OCC, or FED). These 
enforcement actions contain an identification of the weaknesses, as well as specific instructions 
on how and when to address them. The instructions can contain both governance provisions, 
which require changes in board and management personnel and practices, and provisions 
regarding the bank’s operations and risk management. At the FDIC and the OCC, these actions 
take the form of cease-and-desist orders; at the FED, the primary conduit is comprised of written 
agreements.  
Prior research shows that these regulatory interventions have important effects. Peek and 
Rosengren (1995) find that lending at banks subject to formal actions shrinks at a significantly 
faster rate than at those with similar capital ratios. In addition, Jordan, Peek, and Rosengren 
(2000) investigate the stock market response to the announcement of cease-and-desist orders and 
find a negative stock market reaction that is statistically significant and economically 
meaningful. Hill (2011) provides a detailed examination of the contents of the enforcement 
actions and shows that regulators use them to mandate higher bank-specific capital requirements. 
Consistent with the data in our study, she finds a sharp rise in the rate of formal enforcement 
actions during the crisis period. 
A bank failure is the closing of a bank by its chartering authority, which could be the 
state regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or the Office of Thrift Supervision. 
Generally, a bank is closed when it is unable to meet its obligations to depositors and others. 
When a bank fails, the FDIC, which is appointed as the receiver, is responsible for protecting the 
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insured depositors. Details about the bank failure are published in a press release by the FDIC, 
which we use to collect our sample of failed banks.  
To examine whether regulatory intervention is associated with competition, we run the 
following regression using the control variables defined in (4): 
(5)  Enforce or Failed = α + β1 Competition + Σ βj Controls j + ε .    
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank is targeted for a regulatory 
enforcement action (Enforce) or if the bank was closed (Failed) during 2008-2010. All other 
variables are as previously defined in the discussion of equation (3).  
Table 4, Panel A reports our results on whether a bank’s competitive environment affects 
the probability of its receiving a regulatory enforcement order. The first column shows the 
relation between the five ex-ante risk proxies and the probability of regulatory enforcement. All 
of the risk proxies are statistically significant in the expected direction, except liquidity, which is 
statistically insignificant. The second and third columns indicate that banks in more competitive 
environments are less likely to receive enforcement orders from regulators as measured by a -
1.778 coefficient for Competition-H and -1.453 for Competition-C. The most significant driver 
of receiving an enforcement letter seems to be the regulatory overseer. Based on the first three 
columns, if a bank is overseen by the FED (OCC), it is approximately 3% (7%) more likely to 
receive an enforcement letter than if it is overseen by the FDIC.11  
The fourth and fifth columns show that when we add the five bank action variables from 
the pre-crisis period, Interest_margin, Tier 1, Asset_risk, ROA, and Liquidity to the model, the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients on our competition proxies are 
somewhat mitigated. The coefficient for Competition-H is -1.387 and is statistically significant at 
the 5% level, while the coefficient on Competition-C is -0.737, significant at the 10% level. A 
                                                 
11 This is based on the change in marginal effects for a one unit change in the indicator variables. 
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one standard deviation change in Competition-H (Competition-C) is associated with a 0.5% 
(0.4%) difference in the probability of a bank receiving an enforcement letter. The unconditional 
probability of receiving an enforcement action is 8.6%, suggesting a modest effect for 
competition. As a comparison, a one standard deviation change in the size of the bank 
(Total_asset) is also associated with a 0.5% difference in the probability of its receiving an 
enforcement letter in both regressions. These analyses, combined with those in the first two 
columns, suggest that greater competition is associated with the probability of a bank receiving 
an enforcement order.  
 We examine whether a bank’s competitive environment increases its risk of failure in 
Panel B of Table 4. Our results are similar to those in Panel A. However, while the three 
regulators differ in the frequency of enforcement actions, the identity of the regulatory agency 
overseeing the bank is not a significant predictor of bank failure. Competition is negatively 
related to bank failures in the crisis period. Specifically, the coefficients for Competition-H and 
Competition-C are -2.733 and -1.845 and are statistically significant in columns 2 and 3. Again, 
these results are mitigated but still significant when we add five bank actions in columns 4 and 5. 
The fact that competition measures are still statistically significant in both the enforcement and 
bank failure tests after we control for the five dimensions of bank risk-taking is important and 
implies that the ex-ante risk measures, even collectively, are not a sufficient statistic for the 
effect of competition on the risk of bank failure. This suggests that examining the effect of 
competition using ex-ante risk proxies understates the overall effect of competition on bank 
failure. 
 [INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
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 In Table 5, we examine the robustness of our results to an alternative measure of bank 
competition, the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic as adapted in Claessens and Laeven (2004). 
This proxy measures the elasticity of interest revenue with respect to the bank’s input prices, 
specifically as we calculate it, to interest, personnel, and other operating and administrative 
expenses. This measures the long-run tendency of banks to pass on cost increases. Higher values 
indicate greater competition. The drawback of this measure, and the reason that we use it in 
robustness rather than in primary tests, is that it assumes that the banking industry is in long-run 
equilibrium. Since our study focuses on the financial crisis during which we find a significant 
change in bank competition, this assumption does not likely hold for our sample period. 
However, a number of recent studies rely upon the H-statistic; for completeness we include it 
here as well. A higher score indicates a greater degree of competition, with 1 indicating a 
perfectly competitive market. We find that the H-statistic is significantly lower for banks that 
received regulatory enforcement letters and those that failed, compared to those that did not. This 
is consistent with our hypothesis that greater competition in the banking industry increases 
banking stability. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
V. Competition and Real Estate Prices 
We next examine the relationship between banking competition and changes in real estate 
prices both before and during the crisis. We obtain data on residential real estate prices from the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency, which maintains a quarterly housing price index (HPI) of 
single-family house prices. The HPI is a weighted, repeat-sales index, meaning that it measures 
the average price changes in repeat sales or refinancings on the same properties. This 
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information is obtained by reviewing repeat mortgage transactions on single-family properties 
with mortgages that have been purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac since 
January 1975. We use the state level HPI to calculate the changes in housing prices for each of 
the 50 states and Washington, D.C. 
 The national pattern of residential real estate prices in the United States is presented in 
Figure 2. As can be seen from the figure, the drop in housing prices starts in 2007 and precedes 
the start of the financial crisis. Hence, we define the “crisis period” for the housing price 
analyses to be between 2007 to 2010, rather than 2008 to 2010. There is a clear, monotonic 
increase in the national housing price index in the pre-crisis period from the beginning of 2000 to 
the end of 2006. Over this time period, housing prices increased by almost 60% nationwide. 
However, from the beginning of 2007 through the end of 2010, the housing price index dropped 
about 12%. Though the housing price index at the end of 2010 is still well above that at the end 
of 2000, this drop represents a dramatic reversal in the real estate pricing trend. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In this section, we examine the role of competition in influencing housing price changes 
from two time periods, 2001 to 2006 and 2007 to 2010. For the analyses in this section, we use 
the average competition proxies measured from 2001 to 2006. Table 6 provides, for each state, 
some descriptive information about our measures of competition (not as yet multiplied by -1), 
Herfindahl and Concentration, and changes in the housing price index, from 2001 to 2006 and 
2007 to 2010 separately, across the 50 states and Washington, D.C. We find statistics similar to 
those in Table 2. Kansas has the lowest Herfindahl Index at 0.027, while Utah has the highest at 
0.370; Iowa has the lowest Concentration ratio at 0.249 and Delaware has the highest at 0.915. 
The change in the housing price index is positive for the years 2001 to 2006, ranging from 0.186 
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in Michigan to 1.414 in Washington, D.C. The change in the housing price index from 2007 to 
2010 is mostly negative and ranges from -0.466 in Nevada to 0.120 in North Dakota. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
To examine the relation between changes in housing prices and competition, we rely on 
the following basic regression specification: 
(6)   HPI change = α + β1 Competition + Σ βj Controls j + ε.    
The dependent variable is HPI change, either from 2001 to 2006 (the pre-crisis period) or 
2007 to 2010 (the crisis period). As in our previous regressions, Competition is either 
Competition-H or Competition-C. To control for potential correlated omitted variables, we 
include a number of control variables (Controls) that correspond to each period. Our controls are 
Walk, Ch_unemployment, Ch_GDP_per_capita, and Ch_population. Walk is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the state is a non-recourse mortgage state. We use the classification from 
Ghent and Kudlyak (2011), who show that non-recourse status affects mortgage defaults. 
Ch_unemployment is the percentage change in the unemployment rate over the measurement 
period. Ch_GDP_per_capita is the percentage change in GDP per capita over the measurement 
period. Ch_population is the percentage change in population over the measurement period. The 
sample in the analyses consists of 51 observations, specifically, the 50 states and Washington, 
D.C. 
In Table 7, we present the results of our examination of the relationship between banking 
competition and housing prices over both the pre-crisis and crisis periods. The dependent 
variable in the first (last) two columns is the change in real estate prices from 2001 to 2006 (2007 
to 2010). The results in the first two columns indicate that more competition is associated with 
lower real estate price increases: the respective coefficients for Competition-H and Competition-
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C are -0.939 and -0.942, both significant. Thus, we find that more competition within a state’s 
banking environment is associated with a smaller increase in real estate prices over this pre-crisis 
period. The relationship between competition and changes in real estate prices changes during 
the crisis period is shown in the last two columns. Here, we find that more competition is 
associated with a smaller decrease in real estate prices: the coefficients for Competition-H and 
Competition-C are a statistically significant 0.287 and 0.174. Perhaps not surprisingly, we find 
that unemployment growth and borrowers’ ability to walk away from their mortgage obligations 
(through non-recourse mortgages) are strong drivers of the real estate price decline from 2007 to 
2010. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
The reversal in the sign on the competition coefficients between the first two and last two 
columns provides us with an interesting insight into the effects of banking competition on real 
estate prices. States with less competition in the pre-crisis period experienced a higher run-up in 
real estate prices. However, these states also experienced the greatest real estate price declines 
during the financial crisis from 2007 to 2010. This evidence is inconsistent with competition 
increasing real estate price inflation and suggests instead that a lack of banking competition 
inflated real estate prices to artificially high levels and contributed to the financial crisis.  
Next, to gain more insight in how banking competition may have affected real estate 
prices, we examine the relation between banking competition and mortgage lending decisions. 
For this, we use approval rates on individual mortgage applications collected under the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) of 1975. The HMDA requires financial institutions to record 
and disclose annual data about home loan applications. Institutions covered by the HMDA are 
required to keep a Loan Application Register (LAR), which they submit to the government in 
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March of each year. We obtain the 2006 national LAR data from the Federal Financial 
Examination Council and use it for our analyses of the relation between competition and loan 
rejection.12 We keep only observations for which the applications were either approved or 
denied. We also drop observations for multi-family homes, as this represents a different market 
than the one for single-family homes and our housing price data are also only for single-family 
homes. These data restrictions reduce the sample from 34,105,441 to 22,902,686 observations. 
The regression specification that we use to examine the association between competition 
and loan rejections is: 
(7)   Loan_rejection =  α + β1 Competition + Σ βj Controls j + ε. 
The dependent variable Loan_rejection is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan was 
rejected, 0 otherwise. We construct the following control variables (Controls): i) Loan_amount; 
ii) indicator variables identifying loans with special backing from the Federal Housing 
Administration (Loan_type2), Veterans Administration (Loan_type3), or the Farm Service 
Agency or the Rural Housing Service (Loan_type4), the omitted loan type (Loan_type1) consists 
of regular loans; iii) Income; and iv) a series of indicator variables capturing applicants’ gender 
and ethnicity (Female, Hispanic, Native American, Asian, Black, and Pacific Islander). 
Loan_amount and Income are measured in thousands of dollars. We drop loan applications with 
missing control variables. The final sample consists of 21,454,463 loan observations. We also 
include as controls the following state level variables: Walk, Ch_unemployment, 
Ch_GDP_per_capita, and Ch_population. 
Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample used in the analyses. We find that 
28.9% of home loan applications from our 2006 sample were rejected. The means for 
                                                 
12 http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/hmdaproducts.htm#LAR_TS. Prior studies using this data typically focus on whether 
loan originators engage in discriminatory lending practices based on borrower characteristics such as income, 
gender, and ethnicity (e.g., Canner and Smith (1991), Munnell, Tootell, Brown, and McEneaney (1996)). 
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Competition-H and Competition-C are -0.121 and -0.618, respectively. About 2.2% of the loan 
applicants were insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Almost 70% of home 
loan applicants in 2006 were men and 71.1% of all applicants were Caucasian. 
 [INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 9, we display the results for tests examining the impact of competition on loan 
rejection rates. This table presents the logistic regression results for the full loan sample and for 
two subsamples split by the median income-to-loan-amount ratio. The subsample analysis allows 
us to investigate whether there is any differential effect of competition on the approval of riskier 
loans. We find in the first three columns that greater competition, captured by Competition-H, is 
associated with more loan rejections, as indicated by the statistically significant coefficients of 
0.540, 0.893, and 0.493. These results are inconsistent with the notion that competition leads 
banks to take on more risk loans in a race to the bottom. Instead, they support the hypothesis that 
competition reduces bank risk-taking. The results in the second and third columns indicate that 
the positive relation between competition and loan rejection is stronger for the riskier subsample, 
the low income-to-loan ratio. In the next three columns, we report the results when using 
Competition-C as our competition proxy. We continue to find that greater competition is 
associated with higher loan rejection rates for the overall and low income-to-loan ratio samples. 
Our results in the high income-to-loan sample are qualitatively similar but not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. However, the difference between the two subsamples is 
statistically significant. 
As expected, we find that a borrower with higher income is less likely to have his or her 
loan rejected. Moreover, if a loan has been backed by a federal agency, the probability of loan 
rejection lowers. We also find these effects are stronger in the low income-to-loan ratio sample 
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than in the high ratio sample. Consistent with previous literature, we also find that race is 
statistically associated with loan rejection rates. Specifically, Asians are less likely and other 
minorities more likely to have their home loan application rejected than are Caucasians. As noted 
in the prior literature, these results are not necessarily indicative of discrimination, as there are 
likely other factors correlated with race that these regressions do not capture, such as the choice 
of housing stock (Munnell et al., 1996). Higher growth in unemployment (Ch_unemployment) 
and GDP per capita (Ch_GDP_per_capita) are associated with fewer loan rejections, while 
greater population growth (Ch_population) is associated with more rejections. It is possible that 
when there has been a greater increase in unemployment, borrowers are more hesitant to apply 
for loans for fear of later losing their jobs. Therefore, only very strong borrowers apply for home 
loans under these conditions.  
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 10, Panel A presents the distribution of the purposes for the loan applications. 
Home purchase, refinancing, and improvement make up 41.50%, 48.49%, and 10.01% of the 
loan applications in 2006, respectively. We repeat our earlier analyses from Table 9 separately 
for each of these three categories. Panel B presents our results for examining the effects of 
competition on home purchase loans. For brevity, we only report the coefficients on our 
competition measures, though we include in this analysis all the controls used in Table 9. We 
again fail to find results consistent with competition inducing banks to employ more lenient 
standards for home loan approvals. In fact, we find that greater competition is associated with a 
higher probability of rejection for home purchase loans for low income-to-loan ratio borrowers. 
In Panel C, we present our results for refinancing loan applications. For these loan 
applications, we find results for the full, low income-to-loan ratio, and high ratio samples to be 
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consistent with greater competition resulting in higher loan application rejection rates. In the full 
sample, we find that a one standard deviation difference in Competition-H (Competition-C) is 
associated with a 1.7% (1.5%) difference in the probability of the loan being rejected. Unlike the 
other types of loans, we do not find any differences between the low and the high income-to-loan 
groups for refinancing loans. Given that interest rates were rising during the period leading up to 
2006, it is unlikely that these refinancing loans are solely driven by borrowers trying to take 
advantage of lower rates. 
Finally, in Panel D, we show the results using the smaller subset of home improvement 
loans. Similar to the other major categories of mortgage loans, we find evidence consistent with 
greater competition being related to stricter lending standards. We find statically significant 
results for all six specifications. In addition, we find that the effect is most pronounced for the 
riskiest loans, although this difference is only statistically significant for the tests using 
Competition-H. Overall, the loan rejection tests presented in Tables 9 and 10 support our earlier 
analyses, which also find results consistent with competition not inducing excessive risk-taking 
but actually alleviating it. 
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
Using the recent financial crisis as our setting, we reexamine the effect of banking 
competition on the stability of the banking sector. We employ two distinct approaches. Our first 
approach examines the effects of competition on stability at the bank level. Consistent with 
predictions in Boyd and De Nicoló (2005), we find that banks facing greater competition earn 
lower interest margins and make investments with lower risks. We also find that banks facing 
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more competition have lower profitability, cash holdings, and Tier 1 capital than other banks. 
We follow up on this analysis by examining the link between banking competition and both 
regulatory enforcement actions against troubled banks and bank failures, which more directly 
measure bank stability. We predict and find that banks facing greater competition are less likely 
to be targeted for regulatory enforcement and are less likely to fail. 
In our second set of tests, we examine the macro effects of banking competition and risk-
taking. In particular, we focus on the effect of competition on risk-taking in the residential real 
estate market. We argue that if a lack of competition encourages risky investment behavior in the 
residential mortgage market, this will lead to a greater supply of credit. This lending would have 
driven up real estate prices leading into the crisis and have been followed by a greater drop in 
real estate prices during it. Our findings are consistent with this hypothesis, suggesting that the 
degree of banking competition affects housing prices.  
We corroborate the findings on housing prices by examining the relation between lending 
standards in the mortgage market and bank competition. We find evidence that states with 
greater competition have stricter lending standards in the form of a greater fraction of rejected 
mortgage applications. These results suggest that weaker lending standards in states with lower 
competition were associated with the housing market’s boom and bust. Overall, our study 
suggests that within the United States, greater banking competition is associated with greater 
rather than lower financial stability. 
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Figure 1:  Deposit Market Share of the Top Five Bank Holding Companies 
This figure presents the concentration ratio, the deposit market share of the top five bank holding companies over 
time. The dashed line shows the concentration ratio for the US as a whole. The solid line shows the average 
concentration ratio across the states based on the top five banks in each state.  The deposit data are obtained from the 
FDIC Summary of Deposits and include the total deposits for all banks and savings institutions that are insured by 
the FDIC. Deposits are measured as of June 30th of each year. 
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Figure 2:  Pattern of Real Estate Prices in the United States 
This figure presents the pattern of real estate prices from Q4 2000 to Q4 2010. We obtain real estate prices from the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency, which maintains a quarterly housing price index (HPI) of single-family home 
prices. We rescale the housing price index so that the base period is Q4 2000 and assign it an index of 100. 
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Table 1:  Distribution of Competition and Bank Outcomes across the United States 
 
This table presents the sum of deposits (in billions of dollars) of all banks, the Herfindahl Index, and the 
concentration ratio of banks operating within each of the 50 states and Washington, D.C. in 2006. The Herfindahl 
Index and the concentration ratio are computed using the distribution of the branch deposits within a state. The 
Herfindahl Index is the Herfindahl of deposits held by banks within the state. The concentration ratio is the 
percentage of deposits held by the five largest banks within the states. The table also presents, for our sample, the 
number of banks at the end of 2007, the number of regulatory enforcement orders from 2007 to 2010, and the 
number of bank failures from 2008 to 2010. 
 
State Deposits 
(2006) 
Herfindahl 
(2006) 
Concentration 
(2006) 
Banks 
(2007) 
Enforcements 
(2008 - 2010) 
Failures 
(2008 - 2010) 
AK 7 0.276 0.933 5 0 0 
AL 63 0.091 0.640 141 8 3 
AR 37 0.043 0.393 142 8 2 
AZ 64 0.212 0.875 41 10 6 
CA 498 0.144 0.646 243 61 26 
CO 53 0.092 0.540 139 23 3 
CT 69 0.112 0.670 45 1 0 
DC 21 0.192 0.850 6 0 0 
DE 25 0.370 0.905 23 3 0 
FL 283 0.130 0.663 242 53 33 
GA 144 0.115 0.630 310 56 48 
HI 14 0.349 0.978 7 1 0 
IA 42 0.028 0.288 370 5 0 
ID 14 0.126 0.628 13 2 0 
IL 254 0.054 0.416 610 55 36 
IN 67 0.050 0.403 121 4 1 
KS 38 0.021 0.260 337 24 6 
KY 50 0.034 0.356 184 13 0 
LA 65 0.107 0.631 138 6 1 
MA 122 0.098 0.529 156 3 1 
MD 62 0.128 0.702 54 7 2 
ME 17 0.073 0.513 26 0 0 
MI 107 0.093 0.600 146 20 8 
MN 85 0.148 0.604 416 32 15 
MO 78 0.051 0.415 326 18 9 
MS 37 0.058 0.501 92 3 1 
MT 11 0.078 0.529 73 7 0 
NC 190 0.226 0.797 88 8 2 
ND 11 0.046 0.407 93 1 0 
NE 26 0.038 0.374 234 12 1 
NH 19 0.186 0.763 15 0 0 
NJ 169 0.084 0.581 86 8 3 
NM 17 0.123 0.651 46 6 1 
NV 31 0.181 0.761 27 7 8 
NY 731 0.151 0.693 129 7 3 
OH 180 0.092 0.620 185 13 2 
OK 47 0.036 0.357 252 9 2 
OR 38 0.117 0.688 35 10 6 
PA 189 0.067 0.467 196 8 2 
RI 14 0.186 0.870 8 1 0 
SC 49 0.099 0.619 67 7 3 
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SD 69 0.756 0.906 83 5 1 
TN 95 0.087 0.588 178 11 0 
TX 339 0.083 0.573 604 24 7 
UT 122 0.216 0.749 59 15 5 
VA 113 0.107 0.678 98 9 0 
VT 7 0.125 0.712 13 0 0 
WA 81 0.114 0.618 83 22 14 
WI 90 0.077 0.519 266 22 2 
WV 24 0.071 0.521 62 0 0 
WY 9 0.065 0.481 38 4 1 
Total 4,986   7,351 632 264 
Mean 98 0.130 0.610 144 12 5 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used to examine the relation between bank competition, 
bank actions, and regulatory actions. The sample consists of 7,351 banks. Competition-H (Competition-C) is the 
deposits-weighted Herfindahl Index (Concentration ratio), which is multiplied by minus one so that higher values 
indicate more competition. The steps involved in computing the measure for each bank are as follows: i) the 
Herfindahl Index and the concentration ratio for each state in 2006 are first computed (see Table 1) and ii) a bank is 
then assigned a weighted measure based on the amount of its deposits in each state in 2006. Interest_margin is the 
interest rate for loans (interest revenue divided by total loans) minus the interest rate for deposits (interest expense 
divided by total deposits), expressed as a percentage. Tier 1 is Tier 1 capital as a percentage of total assets. 
Asset_risk is the percentage of total assets, including derivatives and off-balance sheet items, with a risk weight of 
100%. ROA is defined as net income before taxes and extraordinary items as a percentage of total assets. Liquidity is 
cash as a percentage of total deposits. Total_asset is the total assets of the firm (in billions of dollars). Loan_to_asset 
is the total loans as a percentage of total assets. Loan_real_estate is real estate loans as a percentage of total loans. 
Uninsured_deposit is the percentage of the total deposits that are uninsured by the FDIC. FED, OCC, and FDIC are 
indicator variables equaling one if a bank is supervised by the FED, OCC, or the FDIC, respectively. All the above 
bank characteristics (beginning from Interest_margin) are based on the call reports filed in December 2007. Enforce 
is an indicator variable equaling one if the bank experienced a regulatory enforcement order between 2008 to 2010 
and zero otherwise. Failed is an indicator variable equaling one if the bank was shut down by its regulator between 
2008 to 2010 and zero otherwise. 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev P25 Median P75 
Competition-H -0.082 0.083 -0.094 -0.068 -0.046 
Competition-C -0.491 0.132 -0.582 -0.517 -0.381 
Interest_margin 4.831 1.209 4.089 4.722 5.504 
Tier1 10.420 3.549 8.120 9.374 11.541 
Asset_risk 56.875 17.170 45.159 58.077 69.392 
ROA 1.111 0.984 0.677 1.198 1.655 
Liquidity 5.281 4.704 2.815 3.933 5.884 
Total_asset 0.472 1.431 0.064 0.136 0.310 
Loan_to_asset 66.575 15.372 57.735 69.033 77.816 
Loan_real_estate 68.627 19.594 57.616 72.231 82.999 
Uninsured_deposit 40.262 15.426 29.425 37.943 48.644 
FED 0.124 0.330 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OCC 0.208 0.406 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FDIC 0.668 0.471 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Enforce 0.086 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Failed 0.036 0.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 3:  Bank Actions and Competition 
 
This table presents the regression analysis of the relation between bank actions and competition. The dependent variable for each regression is indicated in the 
first row. All the variables are defined in Table 2. The t-statistic of each coefficient is provided in the parentheses below the coefficient. Significance levels are 
based on two-tailed tests. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
  Interest_margin 
 
Tier1 
 
Asset_risk 
 
ROA  Liquidity 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
Intercept 6.385** 5.904** 
 
14.601** 13.826** 
 
5.134** 3.825** 
 
1.396** 1.381**  11.745** 11.034** 
 
(86.68) (74.44) 
 
(65.42) (56.89) 
 
(7.14) (4.86) 
 
(21.95) (19.86)  (39.92) (34.40) 
Competition-H -1.370** 
  
-3.340**   
 
-12.099** 
  
-0.513**   -2.014** 
 
 
(-8.53) 
  
(-6.87)   
 
(-7.72) 
  
(-3.70)   (-3.14) 
 Competition-C 
 
-1.763** 
 
  -3.062** 
  
-6.436** 
 
 -0.147  
 
-2.603** 
  
(-16.99) 
 
  (-9.63) 
  
(-6.25) 
 
 (-1.62)  
 
(-6.20) 
Total_asset -0.100** -0.111** 
 
-0.354** -0.370** 
 
0.116 0.102 
 
0.036** 0.036**  -0.014 -0.030 
 
(-10.56) (-11.87) 
 
(-12.40) (-12.95) 
 
(1.26) (1.11) 
 
(4.38) (4.44)  (-0.36) (-0.80) 
Loan_to_asset -0.014** -0.014** 
 
-0.043** -0.042** 
 
0.839** 0.842** 
 
0.002** 0.002**  -0.068** -0.068** 
 
(-15.19) (-15.52) 
 
(-15.58) (-15.57) 
 
(95.08) (95.33) 
 
(2.71) (2.89)  (-18.75) (-18.85) 
Loan_real_estate -0.014** -0.016** 
 
-0.017** -0.021** 
 
-0.207** -0.217** 
 
-0.008** -0.008**  -0.035** -0.039** 
 
(-20.03) (-23.29) 
 
(-7.77) (-9.68) 
 
(-30.03) (-31.36) 
 
(-12.41) (-12.89)  (-12.61) (-13.69) 
Uninsured_deposit 0.005** 0.002* 
 
-0.004 -0.009** 
 
0.225** 0.218** 
 
0.000 -0.000  0.007* 0.003 
 
(5.79) (2.42) 
 
(-1.62) (-3.26) 
 
(26.24) (24.77) 
 
(0.01) (-0.03)  (1.95) (0.70) 
FED 0.083* 0.111** 
 
-0.422** -0.382** 
 
0.517 0.548 
 
0.054 0.052  0.122 0.164 
 
(2.04) (2.78) 
 
(-3.42) (-3.11) 
 
(1.30) (1.38) 
 
(1.53) (1.48)  (0.75) (1.01) 
OCC 0.235** 0.234** 
 
-0.393** -0.400** 
 
-0.529 -0.577 
 
0.129** 0.126**  0.141 0.140 
 
(7.03) (7.12) 
 
(-3.88) (-3.97) 
 
(-1.62) (-1.77) 
 
(4.47) (4.38)  (1.06) (1.05) 
Observations 7,351 7,351 
 
7,351 7,351 
 
7,351 7,351 
 
7,351 7,351  7,351 7,351 
Adj. R-squared 0.137 0.161   0.081 0.087   0.592 0.591 
 
0.030 0.028  0.091 0.095 
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Table 4:  Bank Competition and Regulatory Actions 
 
This table presents the results of logistic regressions that examine the relation between bank actions and regulatory 
actions in terms of regulatory enforcement orders and bank failures. The dependent variables in Panels A and B are 
regulatory enforcement orders (Enforce) and bank failures (Failed), respectively. All the variables are defined in 
Table 2. The t-statistic of each coefficient is provided in the parentheses below the coefficient. Significance levels 
are based on two-tailed tests. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Regulatory Enforcement Orders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -9.460** -8.374** -8.684** -9.430** -9.511** 
 
(-18.64) (-23.87) (-23.77) (-18.61) (-18.70) 
Competition-H 
 
-1.778** 
 
-1.387* 
 
  
(-3.63) 
 
(-2.57) 
 Competition-C 
  
-1.453** 
 
-0.737 
   
(-4.03) 
 
(-1.89) 
Interest_margin 0.333** 
  
0.323** 0.316** 
 
(7.27) 
  
(7.05) (6.79) 
Tier1 -0.068** -0.069** -0.071** 
 (-4.13)   (-4.25) (-4.30) 
Asset_risk 0.042** 
  
0.041** 0.041** 
 
(9.16) 
  
(8.93) (8.98) 
ROA -0.526** 
  
-0.528** -0.521** 
 
(-12.60) 
  
(-12.64) (-12.43) 
Liquidity -0.011 
  
-0.012 -0.012 
 
(-0.86) 
  
(-0.91) (-0.89) 
Total_asset 0.079** 0.050 0.044 0.075** 0.072** 
 
(2.96) (1.93) (1.71) (2.79) (2.67) 
Loan_to_asset 0.013* 0.039** 0.039** 0.013* 0.013* 
 
(2.35) (10.35) (10.31) (2.34) (2.27) 
Loan_real_estate 0.035** 0.027** 0.025** 0.035** 0.034** 
 
(10.75) (9.35) (8.46) (10.81) (10.14) 
Uninsured_deposit 0.007* 0.019** 0.017** 0.007* 0.006* 
 
(2.40) (6.70) (5.95) (2.28) (2.06) 
FED 0.933** 0.898** 0.914** 0.948** 0.951** 
 
(7.90) (7.95) (8.07) (8.01) (8.02) 
OCC 0.513** 0.474** 0.471** 0.524** 0.521** 
 
(4.47) (4.31) (4.28) (4.56) (4.53) 
Observations 7,351 7,351 7,351 7,351 7,351 
Pseudo R-squared 0.176 0.106 0.108 0.177 0.176 
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Panel B: Bank Failures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -11.331** -11.736** -12.083** -11.292** -11.405** 
 
(-13.29) (-18.93) (-18.91) (-13.27) (-13.33) 
Competition-H 
 
-2.733** 
 
-2.403** 
 
  
(-3.94) 
 
(-3.12) 
 Competition-C 
  
-1.845** 
 
-1.065 
   
(-3.33) 
 
(-1.74) 
Interest_margin 0.322** 
  
0.303** 0.298** 
 
(4.59) 
  
(4.32) (4.19) 
Tier1 -0.148**   -0.149** -0.151** 
 (-5.04)   (-5.12) (-5.15) 
Asset_risk 0.065** 
  
0.063** 0.063** 
 
(8.64) 
  
(8.33) (8.41) 
ROA -0.542** 
  
-0.548** -0.535** 
 
(-9.57) 
  
(-9.64) (-9.42) 
Liquidity -0.123** 
  
-0.123** -0.123** 
 
(-3.71) 
  
(-3.75) (-3.73) 
Total_asset 0.063 0.044 0.040 0.057 0.054 
 
(1.45) (1.05) (0.94) (1.30) (1.24) 
Loan_to_asset 0.003 0.050** 0.049** 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.30) (7.94) (7.89) (0.32) (0.23) 
Loan_real_estate 0.055** 0.048** 0.044** 0.055** 0.053** 
 
(9.59) (9.15) (8.35) (9.66) (9.07) 
Uninsured_deposit 0.005 0.020** 0.019** 0.005 0.004 
 
(1.13) (4.92) (4.44) (0.98) (0.83) 
FED -0.022 0.075 0.086 -0.003 -0.002 
 
(-0.11) (0.38) (0.43) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
OCC 0.182 0.159 0.148 0.205 0.199 
 
(1.02) (0.93) (0.87) (1.14) (1.10) 
Observations 7,351 7,351 7,351 7,351 7,351 
Pseudo R-squared 0.242 0.137 0.137 0.246 0.243 
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Table 5:  Alternative Measure of Competition: Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic 
 
This table presents the comparison of the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic between banks that were subjected to 
regulatory actions (enforcement actions and bank failures) and those that were not. The H-statistic is calculated by 
“estimating the sum of the elasticities of reduced-form revenue equations with respect to factor input prices (…) the 
H-statistic measures the ability of a bank to pass on increases in factor input prices to customers” (Schaeck et al. 
(2009), p. 714). Higher values of the H-statistic indicate more competitive markets. ** and * denote significance at 
the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  Enforce Difference 
 
Yes No 
 H-statistic 0.7581 0.8997 -0.1416* 
    
 
Failed Difference 
 
Yes No 
 H-statistic 0.6988 0.8885 -0.1897* 
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Table 6:  Distribution of Bank Competition and Housing Price Changes across the 50 States and Washington, D.C. 
 
This table presents the average Herfindahl Index and the concentration ratio of banks operating within each of the 50 states and Washington, D.C. from 2001 to 
2006. For each year, the Herfindahl Index and the concentration ratio are computed using the distribution of the branch deposits within a state in the year. The 
Herfindahl Index is the Herfindahl of deposits held by banks within the state. The concentration ratio is the percentage of deposits held by the five largest banks 
within the state. The table also presents the changes in the housing price index (HPI) over two periods: i) 2001 to 2006 and ii) 2007 to 2010. Each change is 
computed as the HPI at the end of the period minus the HPI at the beginning of the period, divided by the HPI at the beginning of the period. 
 
State Herfindahl 
(2001 to 2006) 
Concentration 
(2001 to 2006) 
HPI change  
(2001 to 2006) 
HPI Change 
(2007 to 2010) 
State Herfindahl 
(2001 to 2006) 
Concentration 
(2001 to 2006) 
HPI Change  
(2001 to 2006) 
HPI Change  
(2007 to 2010) 
AK 0.254 0.900 0.599 0.019  MT 0.069 0.479 0.664 -0.001 
AL 0.091 0.631 0.373 -0.005  NC 0.186 0.763 0.346 -0.014 
AR 0.039 0.362 0.368 -0.014  ND 0.041 0.366 0.424 0.120 
AZ 0.220 0.810 1.049 -0.378  NE 0.033 0.347 0.230 0.005 
CA 0.101 0.591 1.226 -0.329  NH 0.196 0.767 0.667 -0.134 
CO 0.070 0.490 0.291 -0.032  NJ 0.068 0.492 0.932 -0.136 
CT 0.104 0.623 0.685 -0.107  NM 0.093 0.555 0.594 -0.060 
DC 0.166 0.816 1.414 -0.080  NV 0.211 0.726 1.091 -0.466 
DE 0.263 0.915 0.808 -0.114  NY 0.117 0.616 0.784 -0.081 
FL 0.093 0.567 1.251 -0.372  OH 0.066 0.507 0.196 -0.054 
GA 0.085 0.567 0.345 -0.104  OK 0.036 0.351 0.314 0.062 
HI 0.236 0.914 1.220 -0.134  OR 0.112 0.667 0.757 -0.160 
IA 0.023 0.249 0.273 0.029  PA 0.055 0.443 0.616 -0.025 
ID 0.098 0.526 0.677 -0.163  RI 0.170 0.807 0.992 -0.186 
IL 0.032 0.298 0.475 -0.115  SC 0.082 0.553 0.393 -0.029 
IN 0.036 0.328 0.200 -0.013  SD 0.344 0.590 0.364 0.066 
KS 0.027 0.297 0.281 0.019  TN 0.074 0.543 0.346 -0.005 
KY 0.028 0.319 0.276 0.022  TX 0.057 0.459 0.295 0.058 
LA 0.092 0.567 0.463 0.024  UT 0.370 0.814 0.470 -0.085 
MA 0.095 0.526 0.612 -0.111  VA 0.083 0.593 0.916 -0.110 
MD 0.088 0.586 1.131 -0.183  VT 0.128 0.684 0.726 -0.011 
ME 0.073 0.504 0.692 -0.066  WA 0.100 0.616 0.730 -0.137 
MI 0.082 0.562 0.186 -0.196  WI 0.064 0.472 0.392 -0.048 
MN 0.116 0.485 0.533 -0.138  WV 0.075 0.541 0.405 0.006 
MO 0.055 0.428 0.373 -0.041  WY 0.065 0.469 0.678 0.036 
MS 0.059 0.498 0.355 -0.019  Mean 0.108 0.560 0.598 -0.078 
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Table 7:  Bank Competition and Changes in Real Estate Prices 
 
This table presents the regression analysis of the relation between bank competition and changes in real estate 
prices. The sample consists of the 50 states and Washington, D.C., resulting in 51 observations. In the first two 
columns, the dependent variable is the percentage change in the housing price index (HPI), HPI change, from 2001 
to 2006. In the last two columns, the dependent variable is the percentage change in the HPI from 2007 to 2010. For 
each of the two periods, Competition-H (Competition-C) is the average deposits-weighted Herfindahl Index 
(concentration ratio), which is multiplied by minus one so that higher values indicate more competition. Walk is an 
indicator variable equaling one if the state is a non-recourse mortgage state and zero otherwise. Ch_unemployment is 
the percentage change in unemployment rate, Ch_GDP_per_capita is the percentage change in GDP per capita, and 
Ch_population is the percentage change in population over the relevant sub-period (2001-2006 or 2007-2010).  The 
t-statistic of each coefficient is provided in brackets below the coefficient. Significance levels are based on two-
tailed tests. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
  2001 to 2006  2007 to 2010 
Constant  0.201 -0.196  0.055 0.114** 
  (1.61) (-1.30)  (1.67) (2.74) 
Competition-H  -0.939   0.287*  
  (-1.71)   (1.98)  
Competition-C   -0.942**   0.174** 
   (-4.27)   (2.59) 
Walk  -0.079 -0.082  -0.065* -0.060* 
  (-0.80) (-0.96)  (-2.37) (-2.24) 
Ch_unemployment  -0.163 -0.077  -0.127** -0.117** 
  (-0.62) (-0.33)  (-3.83) (-3.56) 
Ch_GDP_per_capita  2.851** 2.776**  1.064** 1.040** 
  (2.76) (3.09)  (3.92) (3.95) 
Ch_population  1.206 0.757  2.490** 2.294** 
  (1.11) (0.82)  (3.22) (3.11) 
Observations  51 51  51 51 
Adj. R-squared  0.265 0.443  0.586 0.609 
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Table 8:  Descriptive Statistics for Loan Level Analysis 
 
This table provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used to examine the relation between bank competition 
and the rejection of loan applications. The sample consists of 21,454,463 loan applications. Loan_rejection is an 
indicator variable equaling one if the loan is rejected and zero otherwise. Competition-H (Competition-C) is the 
average deposits-weighted Herfindahl Index (concentration ratio) from 2001 to 2006, which is multiplied by minus 
one so that higher values indicate more competition. Walk is an indicator variable equaling one if the state is a non-
recourse mortgage state and zero otherwise. Ch_unemployment is the percentage change in unemployment rate, 
Ch_GDP_per_capita is the percentage change in GDP per capita, and Ch_population is the percentage change in 
population, all measured over the 2001-2006 period. The remaining variables are loan level variables. Loan_amount 
is the applied-for loan amount (in millions). Loan_type2, Loan_type3, and Loan_type4 are indicator variables 
equaling one if the loan application is Federal Housing Administration-insured, Veterans Administration-
guaranteed, or supported by the Farm Service Agency or the Rural Housing Service, respectively, and zero 
otherwise; the base category is conventional loans. Income is the loan applicant’s income (in thousands). Female is 
an indicator variable that equals one if the loan applicant is female, zero otherwise. Indicator variables are created 
for each ethnic group: Hispanic, Native American, Asian, Black, and Pacific Islander, with the base category being 
Caucasian. 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev P25 Median P75 
Loan_rejection 0.289 0.453 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Competition-H -0.121 0.058 -0.153 -0.111 -0.085 
Competition-C -0.618 0.126 -0.683 -0.637 -0.556 
Walk 0.481 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Ch_unemployment -0.028 0.173 -0.143 -0.063 0.106 
Ch_GDP_per_capita 0.087 0.047 0.059 0.079 0.135 
Ch_population 0.055 0.044 0.017 0.043 0.081 
Loan_amount 0.178 0.204 0.062 0.128 0.232 
Loan_type2 0.022 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Loan_type3 0.007 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Loan_type4 0.001 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Income 0.099 0.139 0.048 0.072 0.112 
Female 0.315 0.465 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Hispanic 0.132 0.339 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Native American 0.009 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Asian 0.037 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Black 0.111 0.314 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pacific Islander 0.007 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 9:  Bank Competition and Loan Rejections 
 
This table presents the results of the logistic regressions that examine the relation between competition and the 
likelihood of a loan application rejection. The dependent variable is Loan_rejection. All the variables are defined in 
Table 8. Standard errors are clustered by bank. The t-statistic of each coefficient is provided in brackets below the 
coefficient. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
All 
Income-to-loan ratio  
All 
Income-to-loan ratio 
 Low High  Low High 
Constant -0.708** -0.506** -0.793**  -0.647** -0.401* -0.733** 
 (-4.64) (-2.86) (-5.25)  (-3.88) (-2.15) (-4.23) 
Competition-H 0.540** 0.893** 0.493*     
 (2.99) (4.65) (2.31)     
Competition-C     0.203* 0.347** 0.192 
     (2.07) (3.58) (1.63) 
Ch_unemployment 0.123 0.182* 0.028  0.137 0.206* 0.039 
 (1.50) (2.11) (0.31)  (1.71) (2.46) (0.46) 
Ch_GDP_per_capita -0.959** -1.474** -0.778*  -0.946** -1.416** -0.774* 
 (-2.88) (-4.09) (-2.12)  (-2.93) (-3.98) (-2.19) 
Ch_population -0.983* -0.431 -1.415**  -0.970* -0.384 -1.405** 
 (-2.11) (-0.93) (-2.98)  (-2.19) (-0.89) (-3.08) 
Walk 0.105** 0.091** 0.121**  0.099** 0.079** 0.117** 
 (3.75) (2.96) (3.83)  (3.53) (2.60) (3.65) 
Loan_amount 0.075 2.168** -1.202**  0.072 2.158** -1.202** 
 (0.53) (9.65) (-3.52)  (0.52) (9.66) (-3.52) 
Loan_type2 -0.830** -0.899** -0.671**  -0.830** -0.899** -0.670** 
 (-6.07) (-6.01) (-4.17)  (-6.06) (-6.01) (-4.15) 
Loan_type3 -1.383** -1.471** -1.112**  -1.383** -1.470** -1.112** 
 (-10.91) (-10.69) (-9.43)  (-10.91) (-10.70) (-9.37) 
Loan_type4 -0.783** -0.889** -0.572**  -0.791** -0.900** -0.581** 
 (-4.89) (-4.81) (-4.02)  (-4.87) (-4.79) (-4.03) 
Income -1.743** -9.376** -0.394  -1.741** -9.357** -0.394 
 (-4.37) (-6.64) (-1.73)  (-4.36) (-6.64) (-1.74) 
Female 0.102** 0.050* 0.134**  0.102** 0.051* 0.134** 
 (5.19) (2.50) (5.92)  (5.19) (2.52) (5.92) 
Hispanic 0.242** 0.152* 0.333**  0.243** 0.152* 0.334** 
 (4.54) (2.48) (7.07)  (4.55) (2.48) (7.07) 
Native American 0.505** 0.434** 0.554**  0.503** 0.431** 0.552** 
 (4.04) (3.19) (5.11)  (4.03) (3.16) (5.10) 
Asian -0.136** -0.201** -0.051  -0.137** -0.204** -0.052 
 (-2.87) (-3.74) (-1.15)  (-2.89) (-3.77) (-1.16) 
Black 0.549** 0.471** 0.621**  0.552** 0.476** 0.624** 
 (12.62) (8.89) (17.23)  (12.75) (9.01) (17.53) 
Pacific Islander 0.241** 0.186** 0.279**  0.235** 0.176** 0.275** 
 (4.47) (3.22) (6.26)  (4.29) (2.96) (6.10) 
Difference between   -0.399*    -0.155  
income-to-loan groups  (-2.24)    (-1.76)  
Observations 21,454,463 10,732,197 10,722,266  21,454,463 10,732,197 10,722,266 
Pseudo R-squared 0.013 0.025 0.017  0.016 0.024 0.017 
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Table 10:  Bank Competition and Loan Rejections by Loan Purpose 
This table presents further analyses of the results documented in Table 9. Panel A presents the distribution of the 
purposes behind the loan application—home purchase, refinancing, and home improvement. The remaining panels 
present the results of the logistic regressions that examine the relation between competition and the likelihood of a 
loan application rejection for each of the three purposes—purchase (Panel B), refinancing (Panel C), and 
improvement (Panel D). The dependent variable is Loan_rejection. Control variables that are included in Table 8 are 
included but not tabulated. Standard errors are clustered by bank. The t-statistic of each coefficient is provided in 
brackets below the coefficient. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ** and * denote significance at the 
1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Loan Purpose 
 
Loan Purpose Frequency Percent 
Home Purchase 8,903,032 41.50 
Home Refinancing 10,403,447 48.49 
Home Improvement 2,147,984 10.01 
 
 
Panel B: Home Purchase Loans 
 
All 
Income-to-loan ratio  
All 
Income-to-loan ratio 
 Low High  Low High 
        
Competition-H 0.348 0.948** -0.036     
 (1.43) (3.98) (-0.14)     
Competition-C     0.183 0.463** -0.012 
     (1.72) (4.17) (-0.11) 
        
Constant and controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Difference between   -0.983**    -0.475**  
income-to-loan groups  (-6.47)    (-6.88)  
Observations 8,903,032 4,402,068 4,500,964  8,903,032 4,402,068 4,500,964 
Pseudo R-squared 0.023 0.029 0.021  0.023 0.029 0.021 
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Panel C: Home Refinancing Loans 
 
All 
Income-to-loan ratio  
All 
Income-to-loan ratio 
 Low High  Low High 
        
Competition-H 1.283** 1.456** 1.525**     
 (6.26) (6.96) (5.26)     
Competition-C     0.545** 0.623** 0.667** 
     (4.66) (6.03) (4.07) 
        
Constant and controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Difference between   0.069    0.044  
income-to-loan groups  (0.28)    (0.34)  
Observations 10,403,447 5,913,056 4,490,391  10,403,447 5,913,056 4,490,391 
Pseudo R-squared 0.012 0.023 0.011  0.012 0.023 0.011 
 
 
Panel D: Home Improvement Loans 
  
All 
Income-to-loan ratio  
All 
Income-to-loan ratio 
 Low High  Low High 
        
Competition-H 1.076** 1.592** 1.041**     
 (4.13) (5.05) (3.81)     
Competition-C     0.301* 0.495** 0.316* 
     (2.15) (2.66) (2.20) 
        
Constant and controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
        
Difference between   -0.551    -0.178  
income-to-loan groups  (-1.66)    (-1.04)  
Observations 2,147,984 417,073 1,730,911  2,147,984 417,073 1,730,911 
Pseudo R-squared 0.034 0.044 0.035  0.034 0.043 0.035 
 
 
 
 
 
 
